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 In response to the Senate Community Affairs Committee’s Inquiry, the undersigned 
American law professors submit the following comments.  (Our affiliations are provided for 
identification only.)  In particular, we believe it would help the Senate Committee to understand 
the current state of American law and how the provision of patents on genetic technologies has 
and will continue to create serious problems for innovation, health care, and society at large.   
 
Our submission addresses the following subjects in regard to American law, which 
respond generally to the issues raised by the Committee’s inquiry.   
 
1. The questionable need for patent rights in genetic sequences and other derivatives of 
naturally occurring materials, certain diagnostic discoveries, and other discoveries; 
2. The dubious legal status of patent claims to such discoveries; and 
3. The serious harms caused by granting patents on such discoveries. 
 
The submission is not an exhaustive treatment of these issues, but rather is intended to highlight 
fundamental but mistaken assumptions about the need for and effects of gene patents and to 
identify significant problems with such patents.  The undersigned would be happy to elaborate 
on any of the issues addressed. 
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The Australian Senate Community Affairs Committee Inquiry into Gene Patents is 
seeking information into the impact of the granting of patents over human and microbial genes, 
non-coding sequences, proteins, and their derivatives and the measures needed to ameliorate any 
harms caused by those patents.  This submission provides the response to the Inquiry of 




We believe that such patents are not needed, are not valid, and are affirmatively harmful.  
Specifically, we have found evidence (and three U.S. Supreme Court Justices have expressed 
concerns) that these patents increase the cost and decrease the availability of health care, impede 
rather than promote important scientific and medical research, and potentially compromise the 
health of not only the American people, but people around the world.  We also have found that 
such patents should not have been granted in the first place under the traditional doctrines of 
patent law.  They reflect discoveries not inventions, they claim products of nature, natural 
phenomenon, and laws of nature, and they are obvious (so that patent incentives were not needed 
to develop and disclose the knowledge). 
 
Harms to Patients and Medical Practice 
 
Gene patents increase the cost of the diagnosis and treatment of genetic diseases.  For up 
to twenty years, a gene patent holder controls any use of “its” gene. The patent holder can charge 
whatever it wants for any test analyzing the patented gene—even if that test uses a technology 
that was not invented by the patent holder.  Myriad, which holds the patent on the BRCA1 and 
BRCA 2 genes, charges $2,900 for its genetic test for breast cancer.  One in four laboratories in 
the United States has stopped performing certain genetic tests because of patent restrictions or 
excessive royalty costs.  Further, patents reflecting genetic and other natural phenomena on 
which diagnostic tests or methods are based not only decrease competition and raise prices, they 
chill medical communication and discourage patients from obtaining needed medical care. 
 
Harms to Research and Adverse Effects on University Scientists 
 
Some gene patent holders have stopped research on “their” genes by researchers at top 
universities, such as Yale, University of California at Los Angeles and the University of 
Pennsylvania.  One study found that 53% of genetics laboratories have stopped doing research 
due to concerns about gene patents.  Some medical researchers have turned down funding for 
research on important childhood diseases because of fears of infringing patents. 
 
 Gene patents impede application of the scientific method of hypothesis generation, 
discovery and replication.  In one survey, half of gene patent holders said they would require a 
license for researchers to study the prevalence of mutations in the patented gene in the 
population.  Even more troubling is the finding that 28% of geneticists surveyed reported that 
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they were unable to duplicate published research because other academic scientists refused to 
share information, data, or materials.  This goes to the heart of science, which is based on 
confirmation of scientific data through replication. 
 
 The grant of gene patents is contrary to long-standing patent law doctrines 
 
Patents are supposed to be granted for an invention. Genetic sequences, proteins, and 
their derivatives are not inventions, but rather are products of nature.  There is a long-standing 
legal precedent – which the language in Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution (the 
patent authorizing clause) reflects – that has been codified in 35 U.S.C. §101 (the Patent Act’s 
subject matter requirements) that products of nature are not patentable.    
 
In a series of cases over the past 150 years, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that one 
cannot patent products of nature, or materials isolated from products of nature, if those materials 
behave in the same way they would in nature. Gene patent proponents try to dilute that strong 
precedent by referring to the 1980 case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty.  However, that case 
provided no basis for asserting that a gene sequence is patentable, even if it were isolated and 
purified; it involved a man-made (genetically engineered) bacterium, which the court carefully 
described as not naturally occurring.  (In fact, the Court was precluded from ruling on the 
patentability of isolated and purified natural materials in that case when one of the petitioners 
withdrew its patent claim.) The Court in Chakrabarty stated: 
 
The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not 
patentable….  Thus, a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in 
the wild is not patentable subject matter....  Such discoveries are “manifestations 




Our recommendation to the Senate Community Affairs Committee is that the Patents Act 
of 1990 should be amended to expressly prohibit patents on genes and non-coding sequences, 
proteins, and their derivatives.  We also recommend that the Act be amended to expressly 
prohibit patents on biological facts and laws of nature, such as patents on the correlation between 
certain gene mutations and cancer. Finally, we recommend that the Act be amended to make 
clear that such prohibitions cannot be avoided by clever patent claim drafting that adds trivial 
structures to or applications for the use of such unpatentable products, phenomena, and 
discoveries of nature.
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1. The questionable need for patent protection for genetic and medical discoveries.
 It is a commonplace to hear that patents are necessary for the biotechnology industry, and 
that the lack of patent protection would result in significant losses to venture and other 
investment capital.1  Proponents of biotechnology patents make it appear that the industry would 
collapse and society would be deprived of the valuable, life-saving innovations that would 
otherwise occur.2  As discussed below (in Part 3), it is not at all clear that the benefits of patents 
in providing incentives for investment, invention, and disclosure in genetic sequence and other 
discoveries outweigh the sequential innovation, competition, and social harms that result from 
the grant of exclusive rights.  But that is beside the point here.  Of greater importance is that 
there simply is no strong case demonstrating that the fundamental assumption that patents are 
needed in this field or result in significant pioneering investment, invention, and disclosure.  
Similar claims for software inventions have been made and criticized,3 and the software industry 
in its early years developed entirely without the expectation of patent protection.  Thus, it is not 
at all clear that patents in fact are necessary or desirable as incentives for biotechnology R&D, 
even without considering the overall balance of patents on sequential investment, invention, and 
disclosure.  Nor is it clear that the absence of patents would lead to any significant reduction in 
pioneering investment, invention, or disclosure (or if it did so, that that would on balance be a 
bad thing).  Of course, it is possible that venture capitalists and other financiers act irrationally 
and might respond by withdrawing funding because of a lack of protection where it was never 
really needed.  But public policy should not (where reasonably possible) be based on catering to 
irrational behavior.  As the current financial crisis demonstrates, it may not necessarily be good 
policy to throw good money after bad. 
 
 In any event, a significant portion of the research and development of genetic sequences 
and medical discoveries is funded by governmental grants to university scientists rather than 
through market incentives.4  Thus, the scientific research funding required to provide adequate 
incentives for biotechnological and medical discoveries may be sufficient without patent rights at 
all.  To the extent that denying patent rights to such discoveries might somehow significantly 
affect these incentives, numerous alternatives exist that may be preferable to exclusive patent 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Written Testimony of the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO) Before the United States Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary, Hearing Entitled “Patent Reform in the 111th Congress: Legislation and Recent Court 
Decisions,” at 4 (March 10, 2009), available at http://www.bio.org/edocs/patent_reform_testimony_31009.pdf. 
2 See, e.g., id. 
3 See, e.g., James Bessen, A Comment on “Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry,” available at 
http://www.researchoninnovation.org/comment on Mann.pdf (May 2005) (“Mann reports that ‘patenting practices 
have at best a minuscule ability to predict the success of a venture-backed software startup’ including these 
financing measures.  In other words, Mann’s evidence does not demonstrate that ‘patents facilitate financing in the 
software industry.’”). 
4 See, e.g., Hamilton Moses, III, et al., Financial Anatomy of the Biomedical Research, 294 J.A.M.A. 1333, 1335-40 
(2005)  (discussing ten-year trends in industry and governmental funding of biomedical research, and noting the 
relative underfunding of medical services research); Tracy Hampton, Health Research Funding Losing Ground, 296 
J.A.M.A. 1219, 1219-20 (2006) (noting that health research investment was decreasing relative to inflation since 
2003).  
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rights.  The World Health Organization is considering alternatives in regard to medical 
discoveries for which small markets do not provide sufficient incentives for large pharmaceutical 
firms to invest.5  Different models of intellectual property rights acquisition and retention may be 
desirable for publicly funded research.  Thus, much of the debate over patent rights in genetic 
sequences and discoveries is really about the role of the public sector in funding, directing, and 
controlling R&D.  The recent history of the financial services sector suggests that a larger 
government role may be preferable to continued reliance on market mechanisms. 
 
 The perceived need for gene patents in the biotechnology and medical sectors also fails to 
account for the existing incentives that already exist for innovation.  In many other economic 
sectors (such as open-source software, fashion, cooking, etc.), vigorous innovation exists wholly 
without patent rights.  In fact, because of the potential for rapid and unrestricted copying, those 
sectors may develop innovations more quickly than in sectors protected by patent rights.  
Moreover, incentives to innovate already exist in the biotechnology and medical areas, because 
the innovators are themselves users of the innovations.6  In recognition of this fact (and of the 
perceived immorality of subjecting medical procedures to proprietary rights), most human and 
animal medical, surgical, and diagnostic methods are not patentable throughout most of the 
world (and are not enforceable against most practitioners even in the United States).  No one 
would seriously argue at this time that we need to patent such methods because without them 
there is insufficient investment, invention, or discovery.  Yet some do make those arguments in 
regard to medical, surgical, and diagnostic products that reflect the same inventive creativity! 
 
Finally, unlike for the pharmaceutical industry where massive costs of clinical trials 
require exclusive rights to protect investments, investments in R&D to commercialize 
biotechnology and medical discoveries (which largely do not entail such costs) may be more 
readily protected through traditional means such as lead-time advantage and complementary 
products and services.7  Even to the extent that some biotechnological or other medical 
discoveries need private sector incentives in the form of patent rights, it should be clear that such 
needs are unlikely to be uniform and thus a patent system designed to provide exclusive rights to 
all such discoveries may be excessive.8  Thus, if patents are to be awarded in this area, they may 
 
5 See, e.g., World Health Organization, Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health, 
Report of the Secretariat, EB116/10, at 4 (28 Apr. 2005), available at http://www.who.int/phi/EB116_10-en.pdf 
(discussing alternative mechanisms to promote R&D in neglected diseases, such as modifications to exclusive 
rights, purchase commitments, tax incentives, more effective spending of public and non-profit money, etc.).  
6 See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandberg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 467, 
483-90 (2008) (discussing conditions under which user innovations will be disseminated and patent rights will be 
counterproductive). 
7 See generally Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: 
Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not), NBER 7552, available at 
http://www.nber.org/paper/w7552 (Feb. 2000). 
8 See, e.g.,Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology Specific, 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1155, 1156 
(2002) (discussing how the facially technology neutral patent statute actually “is technology-specific in 
application”). 
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do more good than harm only in regard to certain types of discoveries (or, more likely, in regard 
to R&D efforts to develop commercial applications of those discoveries) where alternative 
incentives are insufficient and where the costs of patenting do not outweigh the benefits.  It is 
precisely the need to differentiate discoveries from inventions in regard to business methods, 
software, diagnostics, and other technologies that is currently causing the U.S. courts to pay 
closer attention to the issue of patentable subject matter – to which the discussion now turns. 
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2. The dubious legal status of patent claims to genetic and many medical discoveries. 
 
It is indisputable that for decades, the U.S. Patent Office (“USPTO”) has issued patents 
for claims to isolated and purified genetic sequences, proteins, and other natural or synthetic 
derivatives of naturally occurring biological materials (“products of nature”).9  It has also issued 
patents for diagnostic methods based on discoveries (including accidental ones) regarding human 
metabolism (“phenomena of nature”).10  Given the thousands (if not tens of thousands) of patents 
that have now issued containing such claims, it seems odd to state that most if not all of these 
claims are invalid.  Yet, a proper understanding of existing law demonstrates this fact.  This 
unfortunate outcome has resulted largely because the USPTO has followed decisions of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”),11 which has failed to follow or to 
properly apply binding U.S. Supreme Court precedents on patentable subject matter, as discussed 
below.  A detailed discussion of the history of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions on patentable 
subject matter and the exclusions for natural products and phenomena (including those that have 
been isolated and purified from their naturally occurring condition), and of the Federal Circuit’s 
and a few other Courts of Appeals departures from these precedents is available in draft articles 
of the signatories.12 
 
The USPTO’s position in granting such patents is understandable, albeit unfortunate.  For 
almost three decades the U.S. Supreme Court has failed to correct the Federal Circuit’s rulings 
on patentable subject matter and other significant areas of patent law.  Yet, because lower courts 
cannot change or alter legal rules or statutory interpretations established by superior courts, the 
law remains that which the U.S. Supreme Court has said it is (unless or until the U.S. Supreme 
Court or the Congress change the law).  In areas of patent law other than patentable subject 
matter, however, the U.S. Supreme Court over the last six years has returned to issuing rulings 
on important patent law doctrines to correct the Federal Circuit’s failures to follow U.S. Supreme 
Court precedents.13  In particular, the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in KSR International, 
Inc. v. Teleflex Corp. addressing the obviousness (inventive step) doctrine has made clear that 
the Federal Circuit has for many years been misapplying U.S. Supreme Court precedent, leading 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,703,008; U.S. Patent No. 5,654,155; U.S. Pat. No. 5,679,635; U.S. Patent No. 
6,762,293. 
10 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,940,658. 
11 See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991); USPTO, Utility Examination 
Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (2001) (“USPTO 2001 Utility Guidelines”). 
12 See Lori Andrews & Jordan Paradise, Genetic Sequence Patents: Historical Justification and Current Impacts 
(August 6, 2008 draft, forthcoming  in conference proceedings of the Max Planck Institute), reproduced here as 
Appendix A; Joshua D. Sarnoff, Shaking the Foundations of Patentable Subject Matter (draft Apr. 2, 2008), 
available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/research-and-advocacy/ip-policy-and-law-reform.  
13 See, e.g., John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of Patents, 2002 Sup. 
Ct. Rev. 273 (2002). 
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the USPTO to grant and the federal courts to uphold potentially hundreds of thousands or even 
millions of claims that properly should have been rejected or found invalid.14 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s correction of the Federal Circuit’s obviousness doctrine 
(requiring federal courts and the USPTO to properly apply existing law) calls into serious 
question the validity of many of the genetic sequence and other natural products or phenomena 
claims issued by the PTO.  Whether the U.S. Supreme Court will also correct the Federal 
Circuit’s departures from U.S. Supreme Court precedent in the patentable subject matter area or 
will at some point retrospectively ratify them (and the patents that should not have been issued 
had U.S. Supreme Court precedents been properly applied) is uncertain.  The most one can say 
now is that the applicable law has not been followed or applied, that no comprehensive challenge 
to the validity of gene patents on patentable subject matter grounds has been litigated, and that 
patents for natural products and phenomena continue to be issued even though they are not valid 
under the existing law.15 
 
a. U.S. Supreme Court precedent regarding products and phenomena of nature. 
 
 In the United States, as in many other countries, natural products and natural phenomena 
have been considered unpatentable for centuries.  Such pre-existing or fundamental basic 
materials and information are not patentable.   “Patents cannot issue for the discovery of the 
phenomena of nature. . . . [They] are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men. They are 
manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”16  This was 
first expressed in early United Kingdom precedents that distinguished unpatentable ideas and 
philosophical (scientific) principles (i.e. discoveries of nature) from patentable principles of 
arranging mechanical devices (i.e. human inventions).17 The premise was that such pre-existing 
natural materials and phenomena and their discovery reflected not human but rather divine 
creativity.18  The exclusions were incorporated into United States law by statutory interpretation 
of the patentable subject matter provision of the U.S. patent law in the mid-19th Century.  As 
                                                 
14 See KSR Intl. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 1727 (2007). 
15 It should not be a surprise that there have been no comprehensive judicial challenges on patentable subject matter 
grounds to the validity of gene patents.  The United States does not have a meaningful post-grant opposition system 
that can bring challenges to validity unrelated to prior art.  Cf. 35 U.S.C. §§ 302, 311(a).   Nor does the USPTO play 
any such role after the patent is granted.  See 35 U.S.C. § 303.  In infringement litigation, the parties are typically 
already in the business of commercially making or using such inventions and themselves have an interest in 
maintaining such patents (as anyone else will likely avoid infringing, will not be sued, or will settle to avoid such 
high-cost litigation). 
16 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). 
17 See, e.g., Boulton v. Bull, 2 H. Bl. 463, 486 (1795) (Opinion of Buller, J.); id. at 495 (Opinion of Lord Eyre, C.J.); 
Hornblower v. Boulton, (1799) 101 Eng. Rep. 1285, 1288 (K.B.) (Opinion of Lord Kenyon, C.J.); Rex v. Wheeler, 
(1819) 2 B. & Ald. 345, 350-53 (K.B.) (Abbott, C.J.). 
18 See e.g., 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 39 (Little, Brown 1890). 
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stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in O’Reilly v. Morse,19 which quoted from and discussed the 
earlier U.K. case of Nielson v. Harford20 and U.S. case of Le Roy v. Tatham21: 
 
“[W]e think that the plaintiff does not merely claim a principle, but a machine, 
embodying a principle, and a very valuable one. We think the case must be 
considered as if the principle being well known, the plaintiff had first invented a 
mode of applying it by a mechanical apparatus.” …. 
…. 
And hence it seems that the [Nielson] court at first doubted, whether it was a 
patent for any thing more than the discovery that hot air would promote the 
ignition of fuel better than cold. And if this had been the construction, the court, it 
appears, would have held his patent to be void; because the discovery of a 
principle in natural philosophy or physical science, is not patentable. 
…. 
It appeared that, in [the Le Roy] case, the patentee had discovered that lead, 
recently set, would, under heat and pressure in a close vessel, reunite perfectly, 
after a separation of its parts, so as to make wrought, instead of cast pipe. And the 
court held that he was not entitled to a patent for this newly-discovered principle 
or quality in lead; and that such a discovery was not patentable. But that he was 
entitled to a patent for the new process or method in the art of making lead pipe, 
which this discovery enabled him to invent and employ; and was bound to 
describe such process or method, fully, in his specification.22 
 
 Later in the 19th Century, the U.S. Supreme Court in American Wood-Paper Co. v. Fibre 
Disintegrating Co.23 held that purification of a preexisting substance does not create a new, 
patentable product.  The Court held that the primary characteristics and function of the product 
(refined cellulose – vegetable pulp – derived from straw, wood, and other fibers) were not 
significantly different from what existed in nature.24 
 
There are many things well known and valuable in medicine or in the arts which 
may be extracted from…substances.  But the extract is the same, no matter from 
what it has been taken.  A process to obtain it from a subject from which it has 
never been taken may be the creature of invention, but the thing itself when 
obtained cannot be called a new manufacture.25 
 
19 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853). 
20 (1841) 151 Eng. Rep. 1266, 1273 (Exch.) (Parke, J.). 
21 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156 (1853). 
22 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 115, 117-18 (emphasis added). 
23 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 566 (1874). 
24 Id. at 594. 
25 Id. at 593-94 (emphasis added). 
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 Ten years later, the U.S. Supreme Court in Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabric26 
further held that the exclusions from patentable subject matter also applied to synthetic, non-
living products that are not materially different from products of nature.  The patentee had made 
a synthetic version of a dye that already existed in nature (alizarine), but with a brighter hue.  
The Court held that “calling it artificial alizarine did not make it a new composition of matter, 
and patentable as such, by reason of its having been prepared artificially for the first time from 
anthracine, if it was set forth as alizarine, a well known substance.”27 
 
 In the 20th Century, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a significant change in function 
was required to convert an unpatentable natural material into a patentable human invention, even 
though the claimed material did not exist in nature.  In 1931, in American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. 
Brogdex Co.,28 the U.S. Supreme Court rejected arguments that minimal physical treatment 
(with mold-resistant borax) transformed a naturally occurring material (fruit) into a human 
“‘article of manufacture,’” notwithstanding arguments that the product was “the result of a 
process which is defined and described and not a natural product,” exhibited a property not found 
in naturally occurring materials (added resistance to decay), and that the “complete article is not 
found in nature.”29  Instead, the Court held that the treated fruit lacked “a new or distinctive 
form, quality, or property” even though it was “the result of treatment, labor, and 
manipulation.”30 
 
The added substance only protects the natural article against deterioration by 
inhibiting development of extraneous spores upon the rind. There is no change in 
the name, appearance, or general character of the fruit. It remains a fresh orange, 
fit only for the same beneficial uses as theretofore.31 
 
In 1948, the U.S. Supreme Court reiterated the distinction between patents on the 
discovered natural materials or scientific principles and on inventions reflecting human 
creativity.  In Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,32 the Court held that a patent claim to 
a mixture of root nodule bacteria capable of inoculating the seeds of leguminous plants.  The 
Court held that the combination of the bacteria species did not produce new bacteria, nor did it 
cause a change in any of the six species of bacteria, but served more of a packaging function.33  
The Court stated that “[e]ach species has the same effect it always had.  The bacteria perform in 
 
26 111 U.S. 293 (1884). 
27 Id. at 312 (emphasis added). 
28 283 U.S. 1 (1931). 
29 Id. at 11. 
30 Id. at 11-12. 
31 Id. (emphasis added). 
32 333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
33 Id. at 131.   
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their natural way.  Their use in combination does not improve in any way their natural 
functioning.  They serve the ends nature originally provided and act quite independently of any 
effort of the patentee.”34 
 
 The 1952 Patent Act codified the prior law on patentable subject matter without change, 
except to define invention as including discovery and to make clear (contrary to some earlier 
U.S. Supreme Court precedents) that patents could be granted for new, inventive uses of existing 
products.35  But the inclusion of discoveries in the statutory definition was not meant to 
eliminate the exclusions for products and phenomena of nature.  In 1972, the U.S. Supreme 
Court made clear that the 1952 Patent Act continued the pre-1952 Patent Act interpretations that 
discoveries of natural materials and natural phenomena were not patentable inventions.  In 
Gottschalk v. Benson,36 the Court upheld the PTO’s rejection of claims to a process for 
converting binary data that had not practical application except in a digital computer, holding 
that: 
 
“[W]hile a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not patentable 
invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of the 
scientific truth may be.”  That statement followed the longstanding rule that “[a]n 
idea of itself is not patentable.”…  “A principle in the abstract, is a fundamental 
truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as non one can claim 
in either of them an exclusive right.”….  Phenomena of nature, though just 
discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, 
as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work…. “He who 
discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly 
of it which the law recognizes.  If there is to be invention from such a discovery, 
it must come from the application of the law of nature to a new and useful end.”  
We dealt [in Funk Brothers Seed Co.] with a “product” claim, while the present 
case deals with a “process” claim.  But we think the same principle applies.37 
 
 In 1978, in Parker v. Flook,38 the U.S. Supreme Court sought to provide more guidance 
to distinguish unpatentable scientific (or mathematical) principles from patentable applications.  
Taking as a point of departure O’Reilly’s statement that even newly discovered natural 
phenomena must be treated as prior art, the Court held that: 
 
[t]he notion that post-solution activity, no matter how conventional or obvious in 
itself, can transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process exalts 
 
34 Id. 
35 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 100(b), 101; Patent Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 797, Pub. L. No. 82-593; S. REP. NO. 
82-1979, at 1, 4, 6 (1952). 
36 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
37 Id. at 67-68. 
38 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
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form over substance….  Respondent's process is unpatentable under § 101, not 
because it contains a mathematical algorithm as one component, but because once 
that algorithm is assumed to be within the prior art, the application, considered 
as a whole, contains no patentable invention….  [T]he discovery of such a 
phenomenon cannot support a patent unless there is some other inventive concept 
in its application.39 
 
Stated differently, to make a patentable invention out of a scientific discovery requires more than 
mere application of the discovery to some specific, useful objective.  Moreover, the inventive 
creativity must reside in the application; including some trivial physical transformation step in 
the claim will not transform an unpatentable application of a scientific discovery into a 
patentable invention.  
 
 In 1980, in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,40 the U.S. Supreme Court held that synthetic living 
organisms are patentable subject matter.  The Court upheld the patentability of claims to 
genetically modified bacteria based on the new function that was introduced – oil digestion – that 
did not exist in natural bacteria. 
 
Here, by contrast [to Funk Brothers Seed Co.,] the patentee has produced a new 
bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any found in nature and 
one having the potential for significant utility.  His discovery is not nature’s 
handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is patentable subject matter under § 101.41 
 
However, the U.S. Supreme Court expressly reiterated the validity of the product of nature 
exception to patentability. 
 
The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not 
patentable….  Thus, a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in 
the wild is not patentable subject matter....  Such discoveries are “manifestations 
of ... nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.” 42 
 
Significantly, the U.S. Supreme Court in Chakrabarty did not rule on a claim to an 
isolated and purified natural material – a biologically pure culture of the microorganism 
Streptomyces vellosus, having identified characteristics – that the Federal Circuit’s predecessor 
had ruled was patentable over the USPTO’s rejection, because the petitioner (in a companion 
case) had moved to dismiss its application just before the U.S. Government filed its brief.43 
 
39 Id. at 590, 593-94 (emphasis added). 
40 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
41 Id. at 309. 
42 Id. (quoting Funk Brothers, 333 U.S. at 130). 
43 Brief for the Respondent at *2, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, No. 79-136 (S. Ct. 1980). 
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Thus, Chakrabarty did not in any way contradict the U.S. Supreme Court’s earlier precedents on 
isolated and purified natural materials. 
 
In 1981, the U.S. Supreme Court found an invention patentable in Diamond v. Diehr,44 
the last patentable subject matter case in which it has issued a decision.  The Court reiterated the 
general understanding of the product of nature exclusion, citing to both Benson and Flook. 
 
A mathematical formula as such is not accorded the protection of our patent laws 
… and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the 
formula to a particular technological environment….  Similarly, insignificant 
post-solution activity will not transform an unpatentable principle into a 
patentable process.45 
 
The Court found patentable the claimed process for curing rubber using a mathematical formula 
for calculating temperature, on facts difficult to distinguish from those in Flook.  The Court in 
Diehr focused on the lack of disclosed or claimed chemical processes, variables, or monitoring 
structures in Flook’s claimed process of catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons that would have 
distinguished that claim from mere mathematical calculation of useful temperature values.46  Of 
greater importance, the Court rejected the argument that the creative contribution of a discovered 
natural phenomenon to the claim could not “be considered at all” in determining patentability, as 
“if [prior art treatment of the scientific discovery applied in the invention were] carried to its 
extreme, [and everything else in the claim were old, it would] make all inventions unpatentable 
because all inventions can be reduced to underlying principles of nature which, once known, 
make their implementation obvious.”47  Diehr did not repudiate Flook’s statement of the law, but 
rather only its application to certain process claims containing some unpatentable calculation 
steps (even if the calculation itself reflected the entire inventive creativity). 
 
Finally, in 2006, the Court dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted in Laboratory 
Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.,48 a case in which the Federal 
Circuit had upheld a two-step (measure and correlate) diagnostic method claim, addressing the 
correlation between an elevated amino acid level and a vitamin deficiency.  Many gene-based 
diagnostic patents contain claims of this sort, because disease conditions are correlated to a 
particular genetic sequence or other marker.  The dissent from the dismissal criticized the 
Federal Circuit’s determination of patentability, because the two-step claim was nothing more 
than an application of the unpatentable (albeit newly discovered) natural phenomenon, even with 
the inclusion of a physical measurement step.49   
 
44 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
45 Id. at 191-92. 
46 Id. at 186-87. 
47 Id. at 189 n.12 (emphasis added). 
48 126 S.Ct. 2921 (2006). 
49 Id. at 2926-28 (Breyer, J. dissenting from dismissal of certiorari as improvidently granted). 
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But one can reduce any process to a series of steps.  The question is what those 
steps embody.  And here, aside from the unpatented test, they embody only the 
correlation between homocysteine and vitamin deficiency that the researchers 
uncovered.  In my view, that correlation is an unpatentable "natural 
phenomenon," and I can find nothing in claim 13 that adds anything more of 
significance.50 
 
The dissent thus highlights the questions left unanswered by the combination of Flook and Diehr 
of when a claim contains steps (or structures) in addition to the scientific discovery that are not 
mere post- (or pre-)solution activity but rather reflect sufficient human creativity beyond the 
mere application of the discovery so as to warrant the grant of a patent.  However, as no opinion 
of the Court was issued, the law remains what as it was in light of Diehr and the Court’s earlier 
precedents.  (A dissent in such a situation is highly unusual and does not reflect a difference from 
a Court opinion as no opinion has been issued.  In this case, the defendant had failed to 
specifically identify Section 101 as a defense below, but the dissenting Justices believed the 
issue had been preserved and was too important not to reach.51) 
 
 In summary, the U.S. Supreme Court’s cases clearly indicate that mere isolation and 
purification of a naturally occurring material is not sufficient to constitute a patentable invention, 
but rather what is required is the creation of a synthetic material different from the natural 
material and having significant new functions not exhibited by the natural material.  Similarly, 
for a newly discovered scientific principle to be patentable, its application to a particular context 
must reflect significant extra-solution activity.  The significance extra-solution activity 
requirement is critically important, as otherwise clever claim drafting would permit applicants to 
avoid the prohibition on patenting natural phenomena and products through a series of narrower 
claims that would in piecemeal fashion encroach on the public domain of science and nature.52 
 
b. Isolated and purified genetic sequences and other natural materials, diagnostic 
procedures, and other medical discoveries are not patentable subject matter. 
 
 Given the U.S. Supreme Court case law, it should be clear that isolated and purified 
genetic sequences are unpatentable in the United States.  The mere fact of isolation and 
purification is not enough of a change, as the products do not have any functions that they did not 
have already.  This is true even though the isolated and purified sequences may now be 
manipulated in ways that would not have occurred under natural conditions to accomplish new 
and useful results.  Similarly, synthetic genetic sequences that are not materially different from 
                                                 
50 Id. at 2928. 
51 See id. at 2925-26. 
52 See Brief of Amici Curiae Ten Law Professors in Support of Appellee Director of the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office, In re Bilski, Appeal No. 2007-1130 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 7, 2008), at 3-6, available at 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/research-and-advocacy/ip-policy-and-law-reform.  
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their naturally occurring counterparts are not patentable inventions, just as synthetic alizarine 
was not patentable in Cochrane.  Treatment of cDNA as a patentable product (either as resulting 
from purification and isolation or because of its synthetic creation) also is a mistaken legal 
fiction and does not reflect scientific understandings of the nature or value of cDNA.  cDNA has 
value only to the extent that it is a more easily manipulated version of the DNA found in nature.  
It does not do anything, nor contain any information that is not already present is DNA itself. 
 
This is not to say that all synthetic genetic sequences (or other biologically active 
synthetic materials – including pharmaceuticals) are unpatentable.  But it does mean that most of 
the patents that have issued claiming genetic and protein sequences are invalid, as they represent 
nothing more than the isolated or purified sequences or modifications to them (by removing the 
non-coding region of genetic sequences, preserving the functions of the naturally occurring gene, 
etc.) to result in materials that perform the same functions that they do in nature (even if they are 
now capable of manipulation in ways that would not occur without human intervention). 
 
Nevertheless, the USPTO has granted numerous patents for an “isolated and purified 
DNA molecule that has the same sequence as a naturally-occurring gene … because (1) an 
excised gene is eligible for a patent as a composition of matter or as an article of manufacture 
because that DNA molecule does not occur in that isolated form in nature, or (2) synthetic DNA 
preparations are eligible for patents because their purified state is different from the naturally-
occurring compound.”53  Such DNA should not be patentable under the U.S. Supreme Court case 
law unless the synthetic DNA is materially altered from that occurring in nature (and not just 
isolated from it) and unless the synthetic DNA performs some significant function not occurring 
in the natural DNA.   
 
The fact that some lower courts have, in a few (often factually inapposite) instances, 
erroneously concluded that isolated and purified natural materials by themselves are patentable54 
does not make those conclusions or factual applications into the law.  Similarly, the USPTO in 
2001 sought to justify the issuance of such patents in 2001 by stating that “[p]atenting 
compounds isolated from nature follows well-established principles, and is not a new practice.”55 
The USPTO relied for these statements in particular on the 1873 patent issued to Louis Pasteur 
and on the federal district court decision in Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford & Co., which 
found (based on two earlier appellate court precedents regarding purification of synthetic 
materials) that purified naturally occurring adrenaline was patentable.56  Such “principles,” 
 
53 USPTO 2001 Utility Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1093. 
54 See, e.g., Kuehmsted v. Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Co., 179 F. 701, 703-05 (7th Cir. 1910); Union Carbide Co. v. 
American Carbide Co., 181 F. 104, 104-07 (2d Cir. 1910); Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford & Co., 189 F. 95, 
103 (C.C.S.D.N.Y 1911), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912); Dennis v. Pitner, 106 F. 2d 142, 
143-45 (7th Cir. 1939); Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 157-60 (4th Cir. 1958); In re 
Seaborg, 328 F.3d 993, 996 (C.C.P.A. 1965); In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394, 1401 (C.C.P.A. 1970); Application of 
deC. Kratz, 592 F.2d 1169, 1172-74 (C.C.P.A. 1979). 
55 USPTO 2001 Utility Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1093. 
56 See Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford & Co., 189 F. at 103. 
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however, are anything but “well-established” as a matter of law, even if the grant of patents on 
isolated and purified natural materials has become common. For example, Parke-Davis treated 
the purified adrenaline as a changed product (because of the purification); different patents at 
issue claimed the purified active principle in both basic and salt forms and the active principle 
was previously extracted only as a salt.57  Judge Hand stated that that no “rule” precluded 
patenting “an extracted product without change” and that the purified product was changed “not 
in degree, but in kind.”58  Judge Hand was wrong on both counts (regardless of whether either 
form was synthetic or only purified).  American Wood Products had established that a merely 
purified natural product was not patentable, even if it was more useful when purified.  Cochrane 
had established (and Brogdex later reaffirmed) that a significant new function was needed to 
make even a synthetic product (similar to a naturally occurring one) into a new patentable thing.  
No such significant new function was identified in Parke-Davis, only a greater utility (on which 
the novelty and patentability of purified adrenaline was based).59 
 
In addition to genetic sequence claims, many diagnostic claims that have issued from the 
USPTO are likely to be invalid.  As noted above, at least three Justices of the U.S. Supreme 
Court believe that measure and correlate claims like those in the Laboratory Corp. of America 
Holdings case are not even close to being considered patentable subject matter.60  In their view, 
not only do such claims fail to reflect any significant inventive creativity beyond applying the 
newly discovered natural phenomena, but also the claim was not viewed as accomplishing a 
physical transformation that would impart patentability of the claim as a whole, even if the 
measurement step required physical transformation (in the alteration of blood samples).61  
Further, the Justices discussed numerous reasons why patents such as these are bad for society 
(as explained in more detail in Section 3).62 
 
More recently, the Federal Circuit en banc decided In re Bilski,63 enunciating a 
“definitive test” that a process claim reflecting “a particular application of a fundamental 
principle” reflects patentable subject matter if “(1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, 
or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.”64  Further, “even if a claim 
recites a specific machine or a particular transformation of a specific article, the recited machine 
or transformation must not constitute mere ‘insignificant [pre- or] postsolution activity,’” and the  
 
57 See id. at  103, 106. 
58 Id. 
59 See id. at 103 (“while it is of course possible logically to call this a purification of the principle, it became for 
every practical purpose a new thing commercially and therapeutically.”).   
60 See 126 S.Ct. at 2927 (“this case is not at the boundary”). 
61 See id. 
62 See id. at 2927-28. 
63 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
64 Id. at 954. 
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“transformation must be central to the purpose of the claimed process.”65  Although a petition for 
review by the U.S. Supreme Court has been filed, Bilski already has had far-reaching 
implications.  Thus, in a recent one-paragraph unpublished opinion in Classen Immunotherapies, 
Inc. v. Biogen IDEC,66 the Federal Circuit invalidated a patent for a method of immunization, 
holding that “the claims are neither ‘tied to a particular machine or apparatus’ nor do they 
‘transform[ ] a particular article into a different state or thing.’”67  As noted by one commenter, 
in order to distinguish the Classen immunization claims from all method of human (or other 
living organism) treatment claims, it is necessary to conclude that the type of medical 
transformation accomplished by immunization “constitutes an ‘insubstantial extra-solution 
activity.’”68  Another pending case – Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative 
Services69 – will test whether the Classen approach applies to diagnostics involving 
administration of non-naturally occurring substances, given that the claim may still reflect a 
natural phenomenon (albeit one that would not occur but for artificial conditions, such as 
involved in the Cochrane and Brogdex cases).   
 
Stated differently, claims such as those in Bilski, Classen, and Prometheus reflect patents 
on information about the world and prohibit thought using such information, which may be 
problematic without regard to whether the conditions triggering such thought are natural or 
artificial.  Significantly, in identifying what constitute unpatentable transformations of data (as 
lacking sufficient physicality),70 the  Bilski opinion relied on a predecessor court’s decision in In 
re Meyer.71  Mayer invalidated a patent for neurological diagnosis that involved identifying a 
malfunction in a multi-component system (the steps of which were not naturally occurring).72  
Like these diagnostic claims, genetic and other sequence claims are valuable not for their 
physical properties or interactions, but for their information content, regardless of whether they 
are natural or synthetic. 
 
Assuming (as is likely) that In re Bilski’s machine-or-transformation test will now be 
applied by the courts and the USPTO, many (if not most) diagnostic claims and many other 
claims applying medical discoveries will be found unpatentable.  They either do not recite 
machine implementation steps or physical transformation steps at all, or any such steps in the 
claims likely reflect either extra-solution activity or transformations that are not central to the 
 
65 Id. at 957, 962. 
66 2008 WL 5273107 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 19, 2008). 
67 Id. at *1 (quoting Bilski, 535 F.3d at 954). 
68 Christopher M. Holman, Classen v. Biogen: The Federal Circuit Applies Bilski to the Life Sciences, Holman’s 
Biotech IP Blog (Dec. 19, 2008), available at http://holmansbiotechipblog.blogspot.com/2008/12/classen-v-biogen-
federal-circuit.html. 
69 No. 2008-1403 (Fed. Cir.). 
70 535 F.3d at 962-63. 
71 688 F.2d 789 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
72 See id. at  
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claimed processes (just as the Justices in Metabolite Laboratories case viewed the physical 
measurement steps involved as not altering the unpatentable nature of the claimed invention).  
For example, a federal district court recently held unpatentable claims relating to a new medical 
discovery (fortuitously resulting from legally required clinical testing) that the bioavailability of 
a pharmaceutical product (for which the composition patent had expired) increased when taken 
with food.73  Not only was “the food effect … an inherent property of the prior art and, therefore, 
unpatentable … informing a patient of that inherent property is likewise unpatentable.”74 
Disseminating the new medical knowledge neither resulted in a transformation nor employed a 
machine (and at most was insignificant post-solution activity).75  Moreover, “[s]uch a claim, 
which effectively allows a patentee to exclude others from informing people of (unpatentable) 
scientific discoveries is anathema to the aims of the patent statute, which favors disclosure.”76 
 
Although the Bilski decision on its face applies only to claims for processes, the U.S. 
Supreme Court cases addressing the exclusion for natural products and natural phenomena are 
not restricted to process claims and the Bilski decision has not been viewed by the USPTO as 
limited to processes.  Thus, in Ex Parte Atkin,77 after holding method claims unpatentable in 
light of Bilski, the USPTO also held claims to a system comprising elements for performing the 
functions represented by those steps similarly ineligible, because the claims as construed 
encompassed the same scope.  (The USPTO remanded claims for a computer readable medium 
encoded with software for accomplishing the ineligible methods.78)  Accordingly, many claims 
to diagnostic and other medical products will be held invalid under Bilski, particularly if they 
reflect no inventive creativity beyond the mere application of a newly discovered natural 
phenomenon. 
 
c. Many isolated and purified genetic sequences are not “useful”. 
 
Many genetic sequence claims that previously have issued also may be unpatentable 
under a legal doctrine distinct from patentable subject matter contained in the same section of the 
Patent Act, i.e., the doctrine of utility deriving from the requirement in Section 101 of the Patent 
Act that the patentable subject matter must be “useful.”79  As the U.S. Supreme Court held in 
Brenner v. Manson,80 a patent may not issue on process claims unless and until they are shown 
to produce products having a “specific utility…. where a specific benefit exists in currently 
                                                 
73 See King Pharms., Inc. v. Eon Labs., Inc., 593 F. Supp. 2d 501 (E.D.N.Y 2009). 
74 Id. (page citations not yet available) 
75 See id. 
76 Id. 
77 Appeal 2008-4352 (BPAI Jan. 30, 2009). 
78 Id. at *18. 
79 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
80 383 U.S. 519 (1966). 
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available form.”81  The U.S. Supreme Court specifically rejected the idea that use as “an object 
of scientific research” was a sufficient disclosed utility for a process, and made clear that the 
same requirement applied to product claims (and the mere fact that the process would produce 
such products could not be used to evade the utility requirement as applied to such products).82   
 
The Federal Circuit recently applied Brenner to expressed sequence tags (EST) claims in 
In re Fisher.83  The Federal Circuit held that the claimed genetic sequences were unpatentable as 
they had no known function at the time of filing.  The Federal Circuit rejected arguments that the 
disclosed sequences possessed sufficient utility, because they acted “as no more than research 
intermediates that may help scientists to isolate the particular underlying protein-encoding genes 
and conduct further experimentation on those genes.”84  It repudiated the asserted comparison to 
microscopes useful for further research, because the claimed EST “can only be used to detect the 
presence of genetic material having the same structure as the EST itself.   It is unable to provide 
any information about the overall structure let alone the function of the underlying gene.”85  The 
Federal Circuit also rejected the idea that “hypothetical possibilities” or identified “objectives 
which the claimed ESTs … could possibly achieve” can provide the required sufficient disclosed 
utility.86  Although some patent applications and some issued patents may have disclosed 
functions for ESTs (or other sequence claims) that might be found to constitute a sufficient 
disclosed utility (particularly if they were tied to research identifying the function of the genes or 
proteins for which they code), many (if not most) of the claims that reflected large-scale 
sequencing may not have done so.  Thus, any such applications should be denied and any patents 
issued for such claims are invalid. 
 
d. Many genetic sequences, diagnostics, and other medical discoveries are “obvious”. 
 
 In 2007, in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.,87 the U.S. Supreme Court made clear 
that the Federal Circuit (and thus the USPTO) had for many years (perhaps decades) been 
applying an excessively strict standard for determining the obviousness of claims.  The Federal 
Circuit’s approach had undermined the “principle reason for declining to allow patents for what 
is obvious,” i.e., that such patents withdraw “‘what is already known into the field of [their] 
monopoly and diminish[] the resources available to skillful men.’”88  Stated differently, obvious 
patents tax the public for disclosed knowledge that is already within its constructive possession 
                                                 
81 Id. at 534-35. 
82 Id. at 535. 
83 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
84 Id.  at 1373. 
85 Id.  
86 Id. 
87 127 S.Ct. 1727 (2007). 
88 Id. at 1739 (quoting Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152 
(1950)). 
Page | 18 
 
American Patent and Health Law Professors Submission  
Australian Senate Community Affairs Committee Inquiry Into Gene Patents 
 
 
                                                
and thus that needs no such incentives to be developed and disclosed.  Such patents provide no 
present innovation benefits while discouraging future innovation.  The magnitude of patent 
claims that improperly issued (or improperly were found to be valid) and have caused such 
harms cannot be determined.  But there are good reasons to believe that gene patents, 
diagnostics, and many other medical patents are among the most likely to fall into that category. 
 
 In KSR, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the “rigid rule” for proving obviousness that 
had been adopted by the Federal Circuit, which had required identification in the prior art of a 
specific “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” to combine the elements found in a claim.89  The 
U.S. Supreme Court faulted the Federal Circuit for its narrow focus on the motivations and 
problems of inventor, its failure to look beyond elements of the prior art designed to solve those 
specific problems, its rejection of an “obvious to try” analysis where finite predictable and 
feasible solutions exist, and its exclusion of common sense when seeking to prevent hindsight 
bias.90  Following KSR, the USPTO issued guidance that dramatically revised the analysis that 
examiners apply to determining the obviousness of claims.  The USPTO identified seven ways 
that examiners can support obviousness rejections, which focus on the predictability of the result 
achieved or a reasonable expectation of success in achieving some desired result.91   
 
 Applying KSR and the USPTO’s guidance, many genetic sequence, diagnostic, and other 
medical discovery claims should be found obvious.  This is because once the scientific discovery 
task is specified: (1) obtaining the desired isolated and purified sequence requires no meaningful 
inventive creativity and achieves predictable results; (2) adding to discoveries of natural 
phenomena trivial physical steps or structures so as to create diagnostic methods or products is 
what persons of ordinary skill can and would be motivated to do; and (3) creating a new 
synthetic product or process may reflect only the application of ordinary skill to a defined 
problem.  For example, in 1979 the Federal Circuit’s predecessor court had noted – in a case 
frequently cited to support the argument for patent eligibility of isolated and purified synthetic 
chemicals resembling natural materials – that the USPTO had rejected the claims as obvious.  
“The analysis of the natural constituents of foods is now conventional,” and the synthetic or 
substantially pure compound is thus obvious in light of the natural constituent.92  Similarly, in a 
recent pharmaceutical case that closely preceded the Supreme Court KSR decision, the Federal 
Circuit held that a motivation to combine structural elements found in the prior art was sufficient 
to demonstrate obviousness based on the nature of the problem itself, and not the problem that 
the inventor was trying to solve.93  The Federal Circuit also rejected the lower court’s holding 
that the properties of the combination were unpredictable and lacked an expectation of success, 
and even rejected the patent holder’s argument that the combination was at most obvious to try 
 
89 127 S.Ct. at 1741. 
90 See id. at 1741-43. 
91 USPTO, Examination Guidelines for Determining Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. § 103 in View of the Supreme 
Court Decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 72 Fed. Reg. 57526, 57529-34 (2007). 
92 Application of deC. Kratz, 592 F.2d 1169, 1172 (C.C.P.A. 1979). 
93 Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc. 488 F.3d 1377, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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but not obvious in light of the limited number of parameters and prior art uses.94  (As the case 
preceded KSR, the Federal Circuit had required an improperly high standard of proof, stating that 
an obvious to try standard for proving obviousness was “impermissible.”95; the claim 
nevertheless was obvious.) 
 
More recently, the Federal Circuit held a claimed isolated and purified active 
pharmaceutical ingredient to be obvious over the prior art chemical that contained it, stating that 
one expects “a concentrated or purified ingredient to retain the same properties it exhibited in a 
mixture, and for those properties to be amplified when the ingredient is concentrated or purified” 
(which thereby provides the obvious motivation to do so).96  Further, “[i]solation of interesting 
compounds is a mainstay of the chemist’s art,” and “[i]f it is known how to perform such an 
isolation, doing so ‘is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common 
sense.’”97  The active ingredient either was known or there was sufficient reason to look to it, 
and there were no unexpected results of purification that would rebut the prima facie 
determination of obviousness.98 Genetic sequences are similarly likely to be obvious because: (1) 
the desirable property of a gene is derived from its coding region, therefore creating a prima 
facie case of obviousness; and (2) a prima facie case of obviousness may not be rebutted by 
arguing unexpected results if the “isolated” and a “purified” gene retains the properties it 
exhibited in its natural form. 
 
Isolated and purified genetic sequences also are likely to be obvious because isolation, 
purification, and identification do not require (particularly in recent decades) anything beyond 
ordinary mechanical skill.  Typically, such isolation and purification required only the 
application of techniques fully disclosed (and made operable) by the prior art, which merely 
needed to be applied to the target under investigation.  As the USPTO’s guidance has long made 
clear: 
 
the mere purity of a product, by itself, does not render the product unobvious….  
Factors to be considered … include whether the claimed chemical composition 
has the same utility as closely related materials in the prior art make, and whether 
the prior art suggests the particular form or structure of the claimed material or 
suitable methods of obtaining that form or structure.99 
 
 
94 See id. at 1365-66. 
95 Id. at 1365. 
96 Aventis Pharm Deutschland v. Lupin, LTD., 499 F.3d 1293, 1302 (Fed.Cir. 2007). 
97 Id. (quoting KSR Int’l. Co., 127 S.Ct. at 1742).   
98 See id. 
99 USPTO, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, § 2144.04 at 2100-150 (8th ed. Rev. 6 Sept. 2007) (“Purifying an 
Old Product”). 
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This guidance, moreover, predates the expansive understanding of the ways to demonstrate 
obviousness now permitted by KSR.   
 
Although selection of the target might possibly involve some creativity, KSR made clear 
that obviousness does not depend on creativity in the selection of the problem that the inventor 
was seeking to solve, but rather requires only an objective basis in the field for achieving the 
solution to any problem that would arrive at the claimed invention.  And as a matter of practice, 
isolation and purification of genetic sequences does not even need to address an identified 
problem.  A founder of a company selling genetic sequencing hardware recently noted that the 
use of an “ultra-high-throughput sequencing machine” permits a single machine operator only 
two weeks to obtain a “tenfold coverage” of a particular human genome.100  For such sequencing 
discoveries, and particularly in recent years where automation has replaced human labor, no 
sufficient inventive creativity is involved.   
 
 
100 Steven Quake, Guest Column: Genome Mania, NYTimes.com (Mar. 3, 2009), at 
http://judson.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/03/guest-column-genome-mania.  
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3. The serious harms caused by granting patents on genetic and similar medical 
discoveries. 
 
 As three U.S. Supreme Court Justices stated in the Laboratory Corp. of America case, 
just making clear the legal status of diagnostic claims based on newly discovered natural 
phenomena would benefit “those who engage in medical research, who practice medicine, and 
who as patients depend upon proper health care.”101  But the Justices also emphasized the serious 
harms that such patents impose on patients, doctors, medical practice, and medical innovation.  
Such patents: 
 
may inhibit doctors from using their best medical judgment; they may force 
doctors to spend unnecessary time and energy to enter into license agreements; 
they may divert resources from the medical task of health care to the legal task of 
searching patent files for similar simple correlations; they may raise the cost of 
healthcare while inhibiting its effective delivery.”102 
 
Similarly, such patents: 
 
can discourage research by impeding the free exchange of information, for 
example by forcing researchers to avoid the use of potentially patented ideas, by 
leading them to conduct costly and time-consuming searches of existing or 
pending patents, by requiring complex licensing arrangements, and by raising the 
costs of using the patented information, sometimes prohibitively so.103   
 
Not only were Supreme Court Justices concerned, but the American medical, patient, and 
industrial communities also were concerned, as reflected in amicus briefs filed in that case by the 
American Medical Association and other medical groups, by the AARP, and by the American 
Clinical Laboratories Association.104  These concerns were and are not merely speculative.  
Detailed evidence of the harms such patents cause is discussed below, and we focus (given the 
                                                 
101 Lab. Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc.,126 S.Ct. 2921, 2922 (Breyer, J., dissenting from 
dismissal of cert. as improvidently granted). 
102 Id. at 2928-29. 
103 Id. at 2922. 
104 See Brief for the American Medical Association, the American College of Medical Genetics, the American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the Association for Molecular Pathology, the Association of American 
Medical Colleges, and the College of American Pathologists as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Lab. Corp. 
of America Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., No. 04-607, available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/395/labcorp.pdf ; Brief Amicus Curiae of AARP in Support of Petitioner, Lab. Corp. 
of America Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., No. 04-607, available at 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/ipclinic/documents/LabCorpMetabolite-Dec2005.pdf?rd=1 (“AARP Brief”); Brief of 
the American Clinical Laboratory Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Lab. Corp. of America 
Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., No. 04-607, available at http://www.robbinsrussell.com/pdf/319.pdf. 
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Inquiry) principally on the harms of gene patents.  However, the harms extend to many other 
patents reflecting discoveries of nature and of medicine, and additional comprehensive data 
gathering and analysis of the harms would clearly be warranted to demonstrate just how 
pernicious such patents may be. 
 
 Before discussing the concrete evidence of harms, it is important to note that additional 
legal doctrines and licensing practices compound the harms that such patents may cause.  We 
identify but do not elaborate these doctrines and practices here, because we are recommending 
that such genetic, diagnostic, and other discovery-based patents be prohibited entirely.  But to the 
extent that they are not so prohibited, we then would recommend that Australia assure that its 
corresponding patent law doctrines avoid exacerbating the harms that such patents cause. 
 
First, because the experimental use doctrine has been seriously constricted by 
interpretations of the Federal Circuit,105 scientific research and experimentation in general has 
been adversely affected.  In fact, the only reason it has not been affected to a more serious degree 
is that scientists (and their institutions) routinely flout the law and ignore their potential liability, 
based in part on the general reluctance of patent holders to sue research scientists and medical 
practitioners106 (and the preclusion of remedies against most medical practitioners contained in 
the U.S. Patent Act107).  As discussed below, such routine forbearance does not apply to the 
genetics and diagnostics industries, and thus for the patents of concern here the costs to 
innovation, competition, and medical care are truly serious. 
 
Second, the over-extension of indirect liability for patent infringement seriously 
compounds the problems of genetic, diagnostic, and other medical care patents.  Such expansive 
liability not only chills medical communication and medical practice, but also significantly 
increases the costs of medical care.  Under current U.S. law, a person may be found liable for 
infringement indirectly, either by contributing articles that have no uses except to facilitate 
infringement by others or by inducing others to infringe.  The standards for finding a sufficient 
contribution or inducement, and the requisite knowledge and intent of the contributor and 
inducer, however, have recently been set at an extremely low level.  Thus, in the Laboratory 
Corp. case in the district court, the diagnostic supplier of an unpatented assay (which, although 
new, performed in a better way functions that were also performed by prior art assays) was found 
to be liable both as a contributor and as an inducer of doctors who performed a patented 
 
105 See, e.g., Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
106 See, e.g., Joshua D. Sarnoff & Christopher M. Holman, Recent Developments Affecting the Enforcement, 
Procurement, and Licensing of Research Tool Patents, 23 Berkeley Tech L.J. __ (forthcoming 2008) (citing, inter 
alia, John P. Walsh, Charlene Cho, & Wesley M. Cohen, View from the Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, 309 
Science 2002 (2005) (“View from the Bench”); Sci. & Intellectual Prop. in the Pub. Interest, Am. Ass’n for the 
Advancement of Sci., Effects of Intellectual Property Protections on the Conduct of Scientific Research: Results of a 
Survey of U.S. AAAS Members 2-3 (2007); and Christopher M. Holman, The Impact of Human Gene Patents on 
Innovation and Access: A Survey of Human Gene Patent Litigation, 76  U. Mo.-Kan. City L. Rev. 295 (2007)). 
107 See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c); Misha Angrist and Robert M. Cook-Deegan, Who Owns the Genome? 11 The New 
Atlantis 87 – 96 (Winter 2006) (stating that purportedly “contradictory” statements in the law have led “academic 
genome researchers [to] feel more protected from litigation” than they actually are). 
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measure-and-correlate claim.   (The doctors ordered the new unpatented assay to obtain the same 
measurement as previously done in the prior art, and then unavoidably made the mental 
correlation that completed the claimed method.)  Significantly, such secondary liability not only 
impermissibly withdraws the use of unpatented prior art medical practices from the public 
domain, but also chills medical communication.  Given the low threshold for inducement, 
doctors and suppliers may be liable for communicating the medical knowledge that the patent 
itself discloses.  The threat of inducement liability (or of direct liability for patients who would 
perform such patented methods themselves and are not shielded by the statutory provision 
applicable to medical practitioners) discourages proper medical treatment.  A detailed discussion 
of these issues can be found in the U.S. Supreme Court amicus brief of the AARP in that case.108 
 
Third, patents provide the potential for discriminatory licensing and other harmful 
behaviors that may adversely affect research and development or commercialization of important 
new technologies.  Because the underlying reasons for decisions to refuse to license patent rights 
need not be made public, any patent presents the potential for the patent holder to disfavor 
particular kinds of research (e.g., research that might assist abortions) or to disfavor particular 
individuals or classes of people (e.g., people having rare diseases or people of a distinct racial 
group) by refusing to grant access to and use of patented technologies.  Such practices are of 
particular concern in the health-care field.  Antitrust and competition laws are not well suited to 
policing such harmful discriminatory conduct, even when it becomes identifiable.  This is 
particularly true in the United States, where patent immunity from antitrust scrutiny is broad and 
unilateral refusals to license are not considered problematic by antitrust enforcement agencies.109  
 
In contrast to such covert discriminatory licensing practices, there is now an overt 
practice of seeking biotechnological patents on the basis of racial and ethnic categories 
(racialized patents), highlighting the problems of discriminatory creation and licensing of 
property rights in a highly visible and notoriously problematic context.  Racialized patents may 
reflect socially constructed understandings of race, but “corporations … are literally ‘investing’ 
their patents and products with race to gain commercial advantage in the research, development, 
and marketing of new biotechnology products.”110  Not only do the restrictions imposed by such 
patents impose discriminatory burdens on those who may be least able to afford the restrictions 
on access and increased market prices for the technologies protected, but also such patents may 
“have profound implications for both the equitable distribution of benefits derived from 
biotechnology and for broader social understandings and mobilizations of race. In this context, 
law and commerce are driving the use of race in science and medicine.”111 
 
108 See AARP Brief, supra, at 10-20. 
109 See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual 
Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition (April 2007), Introduction at 5-6, available at 
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.pdf; In re ISO Antitrust Litigation, 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000); 
Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Corp., 133 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
110 Jonathan Kahn, Race-ing Patents/Patenting Race: An Emerging Political Geography of Intellectual Property in 
Biotechnology, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 353, 355 (2007). 
111 Id. 
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a. Gene patents interfere with medical care.   
 
Gene patents increase the cost of the diagnosis and treatment of genetic diseases.  For up 
to twenty years, a gene patent holder controls any use of “its” gene. The patent holder can charge 
whatever it wants for any test analyzing the patented gene—even if that test uses a technology 
that was not invented by the patent holder.  Myriad, which holds the patent on the BRCA1 and 
BRCA 2 genes, charges $2,900 for its genetic test for breast cancer.  One in four laboratories has 
stopped performing certain genetic tests because of patent restrictions or excessive royalty 
costs.112 
 
Plus, when a single entity controls all testing of a gene sequence, it might not provide the 
highest quality test or it may decide, for commercial reasons, not to offer testing for all the 
known mutations in the gene sequence.  According to a study published in 2006, the test Myriad 
employs to detect breast cancer risk can miss mutations that help cause the disease.  Myriad’s 
protocol is to “sequence the exons and flanking regulatory regions of each gene and … to test for 
5 specific larger mutations in BRCA1.”113  Because many mutations are inherently undetectable 
by short-range polymerase chain reaction (PCR)—the process Myriad uses—Myriad’s test was 
unable to detect them.114 
 
In the study, researchers sampled DNA from 300 members of high-risk families in which 
four or more members had been diagnosed with either breast or ovarian cancer.115  All 300 
patients had received negative test results from Myriad.116  The research team used 6 methods to 
search DNA for breast cancer gene mutations.117  The researchers found that 12% of the patients 
studied carried rearrangements of BRCA1 or BRCA2 that were not included in Myriad’s 
array.118   
 
Some believe the number of missed mutations to be even higher.119  According to Institut 
Curie geneticist Dr. Dominique Stoppa-Lyonett, the Myriad test may miss up to 20% of the 
expected BRCA1 mutations.120  Myriad’s patents extend to all methods of diagnosing the risk for 
                                                 
112See  Mildred K. Cho, Samantha Illangasekare, Meredith A. Weaver, Debra G.B. Leonard, and Jon F. Merz, 
Effects of Patents and Licenses on the Provision of Clinical Genetic Testing Services, 5 Journal of Molecular 
Diagnostics 3-8, 3 (2003) (“Effects of Patents and Licenses”). 
113 See Tom Walsh, Silvia Casadei, Kethryn Hale Coats, Elizabeth Swisher, Sunday Stray, Jake Higgins, Kevin 
Roach, Jessica Mandell, Ming Lee, Sona Ciernikova, Lenka Foretoca, Pavel Soucek, and Mary-Claire King, 
Spectrum of Mutations in BRCA1, BRCA2, CHEK2, and TP53 in Families at High Risk of Breast Cancer, 295 
JAMA 1379-1388 (2006). 
114 See id.  
115 See id.  
116 See id. 
117 See id.  
118 See id.   
119 See Steve Benowitz, French Challenge to BRCA1 Patent Underlies European Discontent, 9 Journal of the 
National Cancer Institute 80-81 (2002). 
120 See id.   
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hereditary breast and ovarian cancers based on comparing an individual’s sequence with the 
company’s BRCA sequences.121  Stoppa-Lyonett claims that the company’s patent is too broad 
because it prohibits alternative techniques, such as DNA combing, from being used to detect 
mutations.122   
 
Although alternative, less expensive methods exist to identify breast cancer gene 
mutations in a patient’s DNA that could identify more mutations, they are not used clinically for 
genetic testing for breast cancer in countries covered by the Myriad patents.123  Since Myriad 
does not make use of the other methods the researchers used, they are effectively cutting off the 
public from their use entirely.  Dr. Mary-Claire King, a senior author of the 2006 study, 
maintained in an interview that “a fuller testing process would include more than one 
technology, and competition would enable that to develop.”124 
 
The example of Myriad’s BRCA patents also indicate how the ability to patent genes can 
produce perverse incentives to frame scientific data in problematic and sometimes very troubling 
ways.  In response to European Patent Office actions limiting the scope of their BRCA patents, 
Myriad filed and won a more narrow patent to cover genetic testing for particular BRCA2 alleles 
specifically in women of Ashkenazi Jewish descent.  The rationale was that these particular 
variations occurred at a higher frequency in Ashkenazi Jewish women than in the general 
population.  Yet, since knowledge of these mutations was already generally available, the patent 
promoted no medical innovation.  Its only innovation was to protect a share of the market for 
such gene tests.  Such commercialization of basic genetic information here carries the additional 
problem of characterizing Jews as a distinct genetic group.  Not only is such a characterization 
scientifically unwarranted, it is affirmatively dangerous given the obvious recent history of the 
European Holocaust of World War II, which was, in part, premised on a genetic construction of 
Jews as an “alien” race.  As Gert Matthijs, of the Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) in 
Belgium and a member of the European Society of Human Genetics, said at the time of the 
Myriad controversy, "we believe there is something fundamentally wrong if one ethnic group 
can be singled out by patenting….  It means that someone is exploring the limits of what is 
acceptable legally and ethically.”125 The classic rationale for patenting is that it provides a spur 
to innovation.  The case of Myriad exemplifies a new dynamic that is becoming increasingly 
common:  using patents to exploit race and ethnicity in ways that do not spur the invention of 




121 See id.  
122 See id. 
123 See Erik Stockstad, Genetic Screen Misses Mutations in Women at High Risk of Breast Cancer, 311 Science 1847 
(2006). 
124 Andy Pollack, Flaw Seen in Genetic Test for Cancer Risk, The New York Times (Mar. 22, 2006), at 20. 
125 “Patent Singles Out Ashkenazi Jewish Women.  New Scientist, 9 July 2005.  
http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg18725073.300.  
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The ability of a patent holder to prevent health care providers from using a patented 
genetic sequence also denies people crucial medical information.  Most drugs only work on a 
percentage of patients who use them.  An asthma inhaler might only work on three of ten people 
to whom it is prescribed, causing the other seven to suffer symptoms of asthma and pay for an 
inappropriate drug until the right medication can be found.  Genetic testing can help to 
distinguish those people for whom a drug will work from those people for whom it will not 
work, but, if the same entity holds the patents on the drugs and the gene sequences, it may 
prevent use of the gene sequence because the identification of people for whom the drug will not 
work will limit the market for the drug.   
 
One company has filed for patent protection on a genetic sequence that could be tested to 
determine the effectiveness of its asthma drug in a prospective patient.126  The company, 
however, has said that it will not develop the test - or let anyone else develop the test.  While 
such a test would be crucial to doctors in determining which patients would benefit from the use 
of the asthma inhaler and which patients would benefit from a different drug or treatment, it 
would also diminish the market for the drug because a trial use of the asthma inhaler would no 
longer be needed to know if it would be an effective treatment. 
 
In addition to the negative impact that gene patents have on access to and the quality of 
genetic testing, the possibility of patenting genes has caused some physicians and university 
researchers to view patients as treasure troves.  Doctors, health care institutions, researchers and 
hospitals have gone to court to gain ownership of patients’ cell lines, tissue, and genes in order to 
commercialize them, even over the patients’ objections.  Genetic research is being undertaken on 
people without their consent as researchers prospect for genes.  
 
b. Gene patents impede research and affect university scientists’ conduct.   
 
Given the constricted experimental use exception in the U.S., if a researcher wants to 
study a patented gene, he or she must either obtain a license or infringe and risk treble damages.  
In fact, the researcher may have to obtain multiple licenses if patents have been granted on 
mutations in the gene.  Some gene patent holders have stopped research on “their” genes by 
researchers at top universities, such as Yale, University of California at Los Angeles and the 
University of Pennsylvania.  When a non-profit foundation and the American Neurological 
Association wanted to finance research to find a cure for a particular genetic disease, researchers 
were unwilling to undertake the work because of the potential for legal action against them by 
the holder of the patent.  SARS research was slowed down because of concerns about the patents 
on the genetic sequence of the SARS organism.  
 
The barriers to research caused by patents are even greater in genetics than in other areas 
of science.  In a study of members of the American Association for the Advancement of 
                                                 
126 See Geeta Anand, Big Drug Makers Try to Postpone Custom Regimens, Wall Street Journal (Jun. 18, 2001), at 
B.1. 
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Science,127 35% of scientific researchers had difficulty related to being allowed to use a patented 
invention.  The number was even higher – 76% – for bioscience researchers.  As a result, 58% of 
scientific researchers responded that they delayed their research, 50% responded that they 
changed their research, and 28% reported abandoning their research.128   
 
One study found that 53% of genetics labs have stopped doing research due to concerns 
about gene patents.129  Another found that 49% of American Society of Human Genetics 
members have had to limit their research due to gene patents.130  Moreover, once a patent is 
granted in the area of biotechnology, there is a chill on future research using the patented 
 
127 A random sample of 4,017 of 88,117 eligible members was selected and the answers of 843 who actively 
engaged in research were analyzed.   
128 See Stephen Hansen, Amanda Brewster, Jana Asher & Michael Kisielewski, The Effects of Patenting in the 
AAAS Scientific Community (American Association for the Advancement of Science 2005), available at 
http://sippi.aaas.org/survey/AAAS_IP_Survey_Report.pdf .   
129 See Effects of Patents and Licenses, supra, at 5, 7.   
In contrast, a September 2006 article by some leading analysts cited the results of a study conducted in the 
fall of 2004 and published in 2005 that asked “academic biomedical researchers in the United States” to self-report 
instances when they had delayed or abandoned a project because of a gene patent.  See Timothy Caulfield, Robert 
M. Cook-Deegan, F. Scott Kieff, and John P. Walsh , Evidence and Anecdotes: An Analysis of Human Gene 
Patenting Controversies, 24 Nature Biotechnology 1091-1094 (2006) (“Evidence and Anecdotes”) (citing View from 
the Bench, supra, at 2002).  According to the study “only 1%” of academic researchers reported that a patent had 
caused them to delay a project, and “none” reported abandoning a project because of a patent.  Id. When examined 
and put into context, this statistic does not support the proposition that gene patents are not slowing the development 
of and access to genetic technology and thus pose no significant concerns.  First, as noted above, the same study 
noted that these relatively low rates of adverse effects relied on the willingness (after the Madey decision) of 
academic researchers to infringe or ignore the patents.  Second, the investigators did not necessarily ask those likely 
to be most affected by gene patents.  Over 75% of those polled were academics who reported doing basic research.  
See John Walsh, Charlene Cho, and Wesley Cohen, Report to the National Academy of Sciences’ Committee on 
Intellectual Property Rights in Genomic and Protein-Related Inventions, Patents, Material Transfers, and Access to 
Research Inputs in Biomedical Research at 10 (Sep. 20, 2005).  With a majority of the academic researchers doing 
basic research, it is expected that few patent holders would attempt to enforce their rights against the respondents in 
ways that would cause them to abandon or delay a project.   
Genetic diagnostics, unlike most other tools of DNA-based science, are widely-marketable to the public.  
And while there is a real effect by patents on researchers working in the area of diagnostic tool development, few of 
the researchers in the study above worked in that field.  Diagnostic labs have reported being affected by patents with 
at least 25% of diagnostic labs having “abandoned one or more genetics test as a result of patents” by 2001.  
Evidence and Anecdotes, supra, at 1092 (citing Effects of Patents and Licenses at 5).  Caulfield’s group has 
acknowledged the credibility of these studies and the conclusion that gene patents have had a negative impact on 
researchers who use genetics to develop diagnostic tools. See Evidence and Anecdotes, supra, at 1091-92 (citing 
Effects of Patents and Licenses, supra, and Jon F. Merz, Antigone G. Kriss, Debra G.B. Leonard, and Mildred K. 
Cho, Diagnostic testing fails the test, 415 Nature 577–579 (2002) (“Diagnostic testing”)).  The implication of such 
impacts is to adversely affect access to and development of diagnostic tools.  And it is to be expected that such 
effects will also develop when patent holders exercise their rights in regard to other widely marketable products that 
emerge that are protected by gene patents. 
130 See Issac Rabino, How Human Geneticists in U.S. View Commercialization of the Human Genome Project, 29 
Nature Genetics 15-16 (2001).   
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information, including a statistically significant decline in scientific publications using the 
patented information.131   
 
Gene patents also impede the application of the scientific method of hypothesis 
generation, discovery and replication.  In one survey, half of gene patent holders said they would 
require a license for researchers to study the prevalence of mutations in the patented gene in the 
population.132  Even more troubling is the finding that 28% of geneticists surveyed reported that 
they were unable to duplicate published research because other academic scientists refused to 
share information, data, or materials.133  This goes to the heart of science, which is based on 
confirmation of scientific data through replication. 
 
Researchers with commercial interests – who are now the majority of academic genetics 
researchers – protect their interests in ways that are fundamentally changing the nature of 
science.  They keep information confidential that they used to readily share, since, if the 
invention has been disclosed in a publication for more than a year before the patent application is 
filed, a patent will not be granted.134  For example, the scientific report of the discovery of the 
hemachromatosis gene was not submitted for publication until over a year after the patent on the 
gene was filed.135  During that time, people with the disease could have been diagnosed and 
cured. 
 
David Blumenthal and his colleagues at the Harvard Institute of Health Policy found that 
one of every five professors in the life sciences had delayed publication of research results for at 
least half a year in order to protect financial interests in various ways.136  Those scientists who 
directly engaged in the commercialization of their research were three times more likely to delay 
 
131 Gene patents have increased the cost of building on this particular source of knowledge.  A study evaluated the 
existence of the anti-commons effect on scientific knowledge by examining 340 peer-reviewed scientific articles 
appearing between 1997 and 1999 in Nature Biotechnology.  See Fiona Murray & Scott Stern, Do Formal 
Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the Free Flow of Scientific Knowledge?  An Empirical Test of the Anti-
Commons Hypothesis, Prepared for the NBER Academic Science and Entrepreneurship Conference (June 2005).  
The study looked at patent-paper pairs—scientific articles that have corresponding patents on the knowledge 
covered in the article—and compared them to scientific articles that do not have corresponding life science patents.  
See id.  The authors reported that “there is robust evidence for a quantitatively modest but statistically significant 
anti-commons effect; across different specifications, the article citation rate declines by 9 to 17% after a patent 
grant.”  Id.  The authors concluded that intellectual property rights have had a measurable impact on the diffusion of 
scientific knowledge.  See id. at 31. 
132 See Timothy Caulfield, E. Richard Gold, and Mildred K. Cho, Patenting Human Genetic Material: Refocusing 
the Debate, 1 Nature Reviews Genetics 227-231, 230 (2000).  
133 See Eric G. Campbell, Brian R. Clarridge, Manjusha Gokhale, Lauren Birenbaum, Stephen Hilgartner, Neil A. 
Holtzman, and David Blumenthal, Data Withholding in Academic Genetics, 287 JAMA 473, 478 (2002). 
134 See 35 U.S.C. §102(b).  
135 See Diagnostic Testing, supra, at 579. 
136 See David Blumenthal, Eric G. Campbell, Melissa S. Anderson, Nancyanne Causino, and Karen S. Louis, 
Withholding Research Results in Academic Life Sciences. Evidence from a National Survey of Faculty, 277 JAMA 
1224 (1997). 
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publication and twice as likely to refuse to share information than those doing basic work.  
Among the life scientists, geneticists were the most likely to withhold data. 
 
Much of this counterproductive behavior has been spurred by the possibility of patenting 
genes.  In 2006, Blumenthal and colleagues reported on their survey of life scientists at the 100 
most research-intensive universities in the U.S.:  44% of geneticists and 32% of other life 
scientists reported that they had withheld data, either in verbal exchanges or as part of the 
publishing process.  The research being published in the literature was incomplete – 16% had 
withheld information in their manuscripts to protect their lead, 12% to protect trade secrets, 6% 
to allow time for patents, and 2% to protect commercial value.137   
 
The training of the next generation of scientists also is affected by the potential for patent 
rights and its affect on publication.  In a survey of over 1000 doctoral students and post-docs in 
life sciences, 49% said withholding of information had a negative effect on the rate of discovery 
in their laboratory and 33% felt it interfered with their education.138 
 
c. Patents on genes are not like patents on drugs. 
 
Some proponents of gene patents argue that the rationales for patent protection for drugs 
support the patenting of genes.  But genes are inherently different than drugs.  The main function 
of genes is as encoded information.139   
 
There are fewer downsides to granting a patent on a drug or a medical device than 
granting a patent on a gene.  The nature of genes makes them impossible to invent around.140  In 
the case of drugs and pharmaceuticals, the disclosure of a new drug in a patent may motivate 
other researchers to find chemical analogs that may work better or in slightly different ways.141  
                                                 
137 See David Blumenthal, Eric Campbell, Manjusha Gokhale, Recai Yucel, Brian Clarridge, Stephen Hilgartner, and 
Neil Holtzman, Data Withholding in Genetics and the Other Life Sciences: Prevalences and Predictors, 81 
Academic Medicine 137, 140-142 (2006).   
138 See Christine Vogeli, Recai Yucel, Eran Bendavid, Lisa Jones, Melissa Anderson, Karen S. Louis, and Eric 
Campbell, Data Withholding and the Next Generation of Scientists: Results of a National Survey, 81 Academic 
Medicine 128, 131-132 (2006).   
139 See, e.g., Comments of Rochelle Dreyfuss in Transcript, The Brookings Institution, The Limits of Patents in an 
Intangible Economy (Jan. 14, 2009), at 92 (“these products are not valuable for their physicality, for say their 
chemical reactivity in the body, what they’re valuable for is the information that they convey.”), at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2009/0114_patents/0114_patents_transcript.pdf; The True Cost of 
Gene Patents: The Economic and Social Consequences of Patenting Genes and Living Organisms Patents – A 
Greenpeace Document, at 2,  at http://weblog.greenpeace.org/ge/archives/1Study_True_Costs_Gene_Patents.pdf.  
140 See Gert Matthijs, and Dicky Halley, European-wide Opposition Against the Breast Cancer Gene Patents, 10 
European Journal of Human Genetics 783, 784 (2002) (“European-wide Opposition”). 
141 See Sarah Boseley, Scientists On A Mission To Bring Cheap Drugs To The World’s Poorest Countries, The 
Guardian (Jan. 2, 2007), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/medicine/story/0,,1981152,00.html.  
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Patented genes invite no such innovation.  A patent for a particular gene sequence patents the 
sequence itself, and there is therefore no way to invent around that discovery.142     
 
The discovery of genes does not require the same incentives as drug development. 
Molecular biologists were attempting to identify genes long before the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office adopted the position that genes could be patented.  Also, the discovery of 
genes has been undertaken with vast quantities of public funds, as opposed to the development of 
drugs, which is undertaken primarily with private funds (for which investors expect a 
commercial return).  
 
Moreover, there are no expensive clinical trials when a gene is discovered and knowledge 
about the sequence of the gene is used to identify whether a particular patient has a mutation in 
that gene.  In some cases, testing has begun almost immediately after a disease gene has been 
identified.  Because the FDA does not regulate the clinical services of genetic tests (as opposed 
to the sale of genetic diagnostic kits or gene therapies), there is no costly FDA approval process, 
as there would be for drugs. Thus, even if there were a need to provide financial incentives to 
incent such inventions, there is much less of a need to financially compensate a gene-discoverer 
than the developer of a drug, who must take it through costly clinical trials with only a small 
number of drugs actually becoming commercially-viable products. 
 
Gene patents also do not appear to be necessary to encourage technology transfer in the 
move from gene discovery to the availability of a genetic diagnostic test.  As soon as information 
about the discovery of the hemachromatosis gene was published, laboratories began testing for 
mutations in the gene. After a patent on the gene was granted seventeen months later, 30% of the 
119 U.S. laboratories surveyed reported discontinuing or not developing a genetic test for the 
disease.  The patent holder was asking for an up-front fee of $25,000 from academic laboratories 
and as much as $250,000 from commercial laboratories, plus a fee of $20 per test.143  The patent 
interfered with clinical adoption of the test and potentially compromised the quality of testing by 
limiting the development of higher quality or lower cost alternative testing methods.  
 
 In conclusion, it bears repeating that prohibiting gene patents and patents on medical 
discoveries will not remove the existing incentives for investment, invention, and disclosure, and 
alternatives to patents for any perceived need for such incentives may be preferable.  First, many 
related aspects of these discoveries may lead to patentable inventions.  Thus, in the Laboratory 
Corporation case, the natural phenomenon discovery was a fortuitous consequence of the efforts 
to test a newly invented gas chromotography-mass spectrometry machine for assaying the 
relevant amino acid.  That invention was undoubtedly patentable, and provided all the incentives 
needed for the invention and the fortuitous discovery; Laboratory Corporation took a license 
from the patent holder to pay 27.5% of its revenues on that test (which it used for many years 
 
142 See European-wide Opposition , supra, at 784. 
143 See Diagnostic Testing, supra, at 578. 
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before simultaneously offering a new unpatented assay method).144  Of greater importance, such 
innovations are produced because they are needed, and incentives already exist for investment, 
invention, and dissemination.  Finally, much of the investment for such inventions comes from 
governmental funding.  To the extent that additional funding is needed for such important 
scientific research with such widespread public benefits, additional government funding from tax 
revenues would be a preferable and cheaper solution than exclusive rights with market and 
innovation harms.  This has been widely recognized in the pharmaceutical context, where 
estimates are that increased prices from patent exclusivity have cost the public eight or nine 
dollars for every dollar of research and development expenditure incented (including funding the 
high costs of clinical trials).145 
 
 
144 See Lab. Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S.Ct. at 2923.  
145 See, e.g., James Love & Tim Hubbard, The Big Idea, 82 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 1520, 1523 (2007). 
